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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code §78A-3102(3)0).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue: Whether the trial court erred when it granted judgment as a matter of law
and ruled that there were no genuine issues of material fact from which a fact-finder
could have decided this matter in favor of Appellant Charles Pugh by finding there was a
valid basis for Appellant's lien on Appellee Richard Pratt's property.
Standard of Review:

"[I]n reviewing a district court's grant of summary

judgment, an appellate court cview[s] the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,'...and cedes no deference to
the lower court's legal conclusions." N.M. ex rel. Caleb v. Daniel E., 2008 UT 1, | 5 , 175
P.3d 566 (citations omitted).
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS OF LAW
Utah R. Civ. P. 56; Utah Code Ann. §§ 38-9-1 to - 7.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case:

This is an appeal of the Final Order granting

summary judgment to Petitioner, entered by the Honorable Fred D. Howard, Fourth
Judicial District Court on December 23, 2008.
B.

Course of the Proceedings Below:

This wrongful lien action was
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commenced on November 13, 2006, wherein Richard Pratt (hereinafter "Pratt") filed a
Petition to Nullify Lien with an accompanying Affidavit in support against Charles Pugh
(hereinafter "Pugh"). (R. 3). A hearing was held on Pratt's Petition to Nullify Lien on
November 27, 2006 at which, Pratt was granted default on grounds of Pugh's failure to
appear. (R. 23). However, Pugh had not been served at the time of the hearing, thus the
parties entered into a Stipulation to Set Aside the Ruling on December 12, 2006. (R. 25).
Pugh answered and filed an Objection to Petition to Nullify Lien on January 25,
2007. (R. 40). A second hearing on the Petition to Nullify Lien was held on January 26,
2007 before Honorable Fred. D. Howard, at which the Court deferred ruling on the
Petition and set the matter for a telephone conference. (R. 80). On March 16, 2007, a
telephonic status conference was held, at which, the court set the matter for a three-hour
evidentiary hearing for May 2, 2007. (R. 137). At the May 2, 2007 evidentiary hearing,
the court did not take testimony, but instead instructed the parties to take depositions of
all the parties and witnesses. (R. 164).
Over the course of the following four months both parties conducted significant
discovery. (R. 165-583). Pratt filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on September 18,
2007. (R. 475). Pugh then filed an Objection to Petitioner's Motion for Summary
Judgment on October 2, 2007. (R. 479). Subsequently, Pugh filed A Motion to Dismiss
on November 27, 2007. (R. 585). On December 17, 2007 a hearing was held on Pratt's
Motion for Summary Judgment at which, the Court entered judgment for Pratt. (R. 798).
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The Final Order in this matter was filed with the court on December 23, 2008. (R. 855).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

The April 2006 contracts and interactions between Pugh and his business

partners, and Pratt and his business partners, are currently being litigated in a companion
case, Fourth District Court case number 060101257. (R. 48).
2.

In that case, Pugh and his business partners, and Pratt and his business

partners have claims against one another regarding the validity of the April 2006 contracts
and fraudulent actions directly related to the liens in this case. (R. 48).
3.

Despite the above case already addressing all issues involving the liens and

the contracts associated with liens, Pratt brought this wrongful lien action under contract
principles already being addressed in the other case. (R. 82).
4.

The liens at issue in this case came about as part of a business deal wherein

Pugh's business partners would lend Sovren Group, LLC (hereinafter "Sovren") and Pratt
$500,000. (R. 40).
5.

Pratt's main role in the parties business transaction was to provide a

guaranty for the contracts, and real estate security for the $500,000 loan utilizing Pratt's
two pieces of real property. (R. 40).
6.

In furtherance of the parties agreements, a Guaranty Agreement and

Security Agreement (hereinafter "Security Agreement") was executed and signed by Pratt
authorizing his properties to be encumbered securing the $500,000 loan. (R.l 12).

-3Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

7.

Simultaneous to the execution of the Security Agreement, Pratt and Sovren

executed trust deeds and caused Guardian Title to file them with the Utah County
Recorder. (R. 516, 93, Addendum J).
8.

Upon receipt of the signed Security Agreement, Pugh released the

$500,000.00 held at Guardian Title to Pratt and Sovren. (R. 655, 688).
9.

As part of closing the loan and securing it with Pratt's real properties, Pratt

signed U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) Settlement
Statements for each of Pratt's properties. (Addendum J, H).
10.

To date Pratt and his business partner Sovren have not paid the $500,000

back or complied with the terms of the contracts entered into. (R. 42).
11.

Pratt and Sovren entered into Investment Agreements outlining their

contractual relationship with each other. (R. 635).
12.

Pratt testified in his initial Affidavit in this case that "as collateral for an

investment agreement, I allowed the two properties to be encumbered by
Respondent." (R. 4).
13.

Moreover, Pratt testified in his deposition that "the collateral for the

investment agreement, which Charles Pugh provided $500,000 for, I provided
security for that by putting these two properties up." (R. 511).
14.

Pursuant to the Investment Agreements between Pratt and Sovren, Pratt

received a "security interest in and an equity position in ten (10) tons of Maker's
-4-
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(Sovren) high grade concentrate ore." (R. 511).
15.

Pratt testified the ores are worth "six hundred thousand to a million

dollars a ton . . . ." (R. 629).
16.

Also, Pratt's property taxes on his two properties, used to secure the

$500,000 loan, were paid off from the loan monies. (Addendum J).
17.

Pratt testified in his deposition that he believes the Investment Agreements

are currently valid contracts. (R 515).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.

RICHARD PRATT SIGNED A SECURITY AGREEMENT AND
AUTHORIZED LIENS TO BE RECORDED ON HIS
PROPERTIES, THEREBY ELIMINATING WRONGFUL LIEN
TREATMENT PURSUANT TO § 38-9-1 UTAH CODE ANN.

The liens at issue in this case are not wrongful under Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-1 et
seq., the Wrongful Lien Act, as Pratt authorized the liens, at the time of their filing,
through signed documents. Pratt signed a security agreement allowing the
properties to be encumbered, signed Settlement Statements for each property,
and gave sworn testimony that he allowed the properties to be encumbered. The
statute is unambiguous and the Court should not look to contract principle to
determine if a lien is wrongful under the Wrongful Lien Act..
II.

RICHARD PRATT'S CONTINUED BAD FAITH THROUGHOUT
THIS ACTION WARRANTS THE AWARD OF COSTS AND
REASONABLE ATTORNEY'S FEES TO CHARLES PUGH.
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The Wrongful Lien Act provides that a court may award costs and reasonable
attorney's fees to a lien claimant when the court determines that the claim of lien is
valid. Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-6(3). Richard Pratt brought this action in bad faith
knowing that he had signed documents authorizing the liens to be recorded on
his properties. Moreover, As a result of Pratt's extensive bad faith, this action has
been excessively prolonged, resulting in the unnecessary accumulation of
significant costs and attorneys fees, thus warranting the award of costs and
reasonable attorney's fees to Charles Pugh.
ARGUMENT
I.

RICHARD PRATT SIGNED A SECURITY AGREEMENT AND
AUTHORIZED LIENS TO BE RECORDED ON HIS
PROPERTIES, THEREBY ELIMINATING WRONGFUL LIEN
TREATMENT PURSUANT TO § 38-9-1 UTAH CODE ANN.

The liens at issue in this case are not wrongful pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 38-91 et seq.? the Wrongful Lien Act, as Pratt authorized the liens, at the time of their filing,
through signed documents. The Wrongful Lien Act found at § 38-9-1(6) Utah Code
Annotated provides in pertinent part:
(6)

«

•

"Wrongful lien" means any document that purports to create a lien or
encumbrance on an owner's interest in certain real property and at the
time it is recorded or filed is not:
•

•

•

'

.

*

(c)

*

*

signed by or authorized pursuant to a document signed by the
owner of the real property
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The Wrongful Lien Act is a "summary proceeding" and "is limited in a
number of respects." Anderson v. Wilshire Investments, L.L.C., 123 P.3d 393, 396
(Utah 2005). The Wrongful Lien Act is express in limiting its application stating
that:
(4)

A summary proceeding under this section is only to determine
whether or not a contested document, on its face, shall be recorded
by the county recorder. The proceeding may not determine the truth
of the content of the document nor the properly or legal rights of the
parties beyond the necessary determination of whether or not the
document shall be recorded. Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-6(4)

Moreover, the Wrongful Lien Act expressly states that the court may "only
determine whether or not a document is a wrongful lien" and "shall not
determine any other property or legal rights of the parties nor restrict other legal
remedies of any party." Id. § 38-9-7(4).
The Wrongful Lien Act is unambiguous with regard to what constitutes a wrongful
lien and what a court should consider when determining if a lien is wrongful. The Utah
Supreme Court has long held that "(w)here statutory language is plain and unambiguous ,
this Court will not look beyond the same to divine legislative intent." Brinkerhoffv.
Forsyth, 779 P.2d 685, 686 (Utah 1989). The Court in that case continued, stating that it
is "guided by the rule that a statute should generally be construed according to its plain
language." Id.
Under the plain language of the Wrongful Lien Act, the trust deeds at issue
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in this matter were clearly authorized pursuant to a signed document at the time
of their filing. On April 11, 2006, Pratt and his business partners executed two
trust deeds and caused them to be recorded through their title agent, Guardian
Title, with the Utah County Recorder. (R. 93). The trust deeds were recorded by
Pratt pursuant to a Security Agreement signed by Pratt on April 10, 2006. (R.
112). Pratt's property was security for financing in the amount of $500,000, which
funds were transferred by Pugh to Pratt and Sovren upon receipt of the signed
security agreement. (R. 655, 688).
Clearly, the recorded trust deeds are not wrongful under the Wrongful
Lien Act. The trust deeds were executed by Pratt and Sovren, and were
authorized pursuant to a document signed by Pratt, the security agreement, at
the time they were filed. (R. 516, 93). Furthermore, Pratt has never denied that he
signed the security agreement and executed the trust deeds. Moreover, the trust
deeds, which Pratt contends are wrongful, were filed by Pratt and his agents, and
were never even viewed by Pugh prior to their filing. (R. 516, 93).
As further evidence that the trust deeds filed were authorized by a signed
document and not wrongful, Pratt signed U.S. Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD) Settlement Statements (hereinafter "Settlement
Statements 7 ') for each of his properties. (Addendum J, K). The Settlement
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Statements were drafted by Pratt's agent, Guardian Title, and integrated at the
closing of the $500,000 loan from Pugh and his business partners. Id. Each
Settlement Statement, signed by Pratt, clearly outlines the contractual
relationship of the parties, the allocation of the loan monies to Pratt, and payment
of the recording fees for the trust deeds. Id. These Settlement Statements were
drafted, executed, and carried out without the presence of Pugh. Pratt's
contention that the liens are wrongful is not only wholly unfounded, but entirely
disingenuous.
Not only are the signed documents evidence enough of the trust deeds
being valid under the Wrongful Lien Act, but Pratt has testified on more than one
occasion that the trust deeds were authorized by him. (R. 4, 571). Pratt even
testified in his original Affidavit in this case that "as collateral for an Investment
Agreement, I allowed the two properties to be encumbered by Respondent." (R.
4). Moreover, when asked what he meant by the above statement, Pratt testified
in his deposition that "the collateral for the investment agreement, which Charles
Pugh provided $500,000 for, I provided security for that by putting these two
properties up." (R. 511).
Pratt, in his Motion for Summary Judgment, has asked the court to look
beyond the plain language of the statute, and apply contract principles to
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determine if the liens were wrongful at the time they were recorded. The
misguided basis for Pratt's Motion for Summary Judgment, is that because Pugh
had repudiated the underlying contract after discovering Pratt's and other
parties' fraud, there was no "meeting of the minds" to validate the parties
contracts, therefore the liens are wrongful. This contention is irrelevant to a
determination of wrongful lien under the Wrongful Lien Act cited above.
Contract principles do not govern the Wrongful Lien Act, as it was not created to
resolve disputes concerning parties respective property interests. The
mechanism for determining a wrongful lien is not whether the underlying
contract is valid, but is simply whether the "document," "on its face," when
recorded was authorized pursuant to a signed "document." The Wrongful Lien
Act does not even require there be a contract.
The reason the statute is limited in its scope and only requires that the
Court look to see if a document "on its face" is authorized at "the time it is
recorded," is that the statute only provides a quick summary proceeding to
combat liens that were clearly inappropriate at the time of their filing. The
wrongful lien act was not enacted as a "catch-all" lien statute to encompass every
area of law foreseeably related to a lien.

Clearly, the trust deeds recorded on

Pratt's property are not wrongful liens under the Wrongful Lien Act. Pratt
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signed a security agreement authorizing his two properties to be encumbered,
signed Settlement Statements for each property, and gave sworn testimony that
he allowed the properties to encumbered. The statute is unambiguous and the
Court should not look to contract principle to determine if a lien is wrongful
under the Wrongful Lien Act.
II.

RICHARD PRATT'S CONTINUED BAD FAITH THROUGHOUT
THIS ACTION WARRANTS THE AWARD OF COSTS AND
REASONABLE ATTORNEY'S FEES TO CHARLES PUGH.

Richard Pratt brought this action in bad faith knowing that he had signed
documents authorizing the liens to be recorded on his properties. Furthermore,
as a result of Pratt's extensive bad faith, this action has been excessively
prolonged, resulting in the unnecessary accumulation of significant costs and
attorneys fees, thus warranting the award of costs and reasonable attorney's fees
to Pugh. The Wrongful Lien Act provides that "[i]f the court determines that the
claim of lien is valid, the court shall dismiss the petition and may award costs
and reasonable attorney's fees to the lien claimant." Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-6(3).
Although the Wrongful Lien Act only provides the possibility of the Respondent
being awarded attorney's fees by stating "may," Pratt's bad faith throughout this
action warrants an award of costs and reasonable attorney's fees to Appellant. Id.
Throughout this proceeding Pratt has made misstatements, contradicted
himself in testimony, and tried to circumvent the legal system by bringing a
-11Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Petition to Nullify Lien on grounds currently being litigated in another case. Pratt
brought this case pursuant to a Petition to Nullify Lien and Affidavit of Pratt
wherein Pratt stated that he "allowed the two properties to be encumbered by
Respondent." (R. 4). This sworn statement is, in effect, the death knell to a claim
of wrongful lien under the Wrongful Lien Act. Furthermore, Pratt's facts and
argument in his original and amended Petitions seek the removal of the lien
under contract theory. Yet, despite Petitioner's Petition to Nullify Lien being
devoid of any facts supporting a finding that the trust deeds were wrongful
pursuant to the Wrongful Lien Act, Pratt continued to make misstatements and
further the litigation causing Pugh significant attorney's fees.
Pratt's inaccuracies in his testimony are apparent from the outset of this
case. In his initial Affidavit Pratt testified that Pugh "repudiated said investment
agreement and has not loaned said money to me as required by the security
agreement." (R. 4). This testimony of Pratt is clearly false and misleads the
Court as to the true facts of the case. First, Pugh never entered into an
"investment agreement" with Pratt as Pratt testified. The "Investment
Agreement" referenced by Pratt was solely between Pratt and his business
partner Sovren. Pugh, nor his business partners, were not at any time a part of
Pratt's and Sovren's agreement. The plain language of the Investment
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Agreement is evidence enough that Pugh, nor his business partners, were not
parties to the contract. Furthermore, there were two Investment Agreements
executed between Pratt and Sovren. Pratt and Sovren executed an Investment
Agreement for each of the two parcels of property used as security for the
$500,000 loan.
Furthermore, Pratt inaccurately testified that Pugh did not pay pursuant to
the parties agreements. Although the contracts associated with the transfer of the
$500,000 are in dispute in the companion case, Pugh transferred $500,000 to Pratt
and Sovren pursuant to the parties agreements. In fact, Pratt and his business
partners still have Pugh's and his business partner's $500,000, the collection of
which is currently being litigated in the companion case. Moreover, the
Settlement Statements executed at the closing of Pughs $500,000 loan clearly
outline where the loan monies were allocated. The Settlement Statements
expressly note that Pratt received the loan and that, among other things, his
property taxes were paid with the loan monies. For Pratt to execute such
documents and then in turn file a Petition to Nullify Lien, representing to the
Court that he at no time authorized the recording of the trust deeds, clearly
shows Pratt's bad faith.
After the initial hearing where it became apparent that Pratt's first Petition
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and sworn statements only validated the liens, Pratt amended his Petition in an
attempt to fix the problems in his initial Petition. In his Verified Amended
Petition, despite the plain language of the Investment Agreements, Pratt again
testifies that Pugh was a part Pratt's and Sovren's Investment Agreements. Pratt
further testifies in the Verified Amended Petition that Pugh had not complied
with the terms of the Investment Agreements and therefore the liens were
wrongful. This statement is not only entirely inaccurate, but again misleads the
Court as to the contractual relationship of the parties. As explained above, Pugh
was not a party to the Investment Agreements between Pratt and Sovren. Yet,
Pratt is trying to assert that Pugh should be held to the Investment Agreements'
terms. These arguments are blatantly invalid, brought in bad faith, and are
meritless to a determination of a liens validity under the Wrongful Lien Act.
Moreover, Pratt has stated numerous times in his papers that Pugh "placed
the liens on Petitioner's property," yet it was Pratt and Sovren that executed the
trust deeds and caused Guardian Title to record them with the Utah County
Recorder. (R.516, 93, A d d e n d u m J). Pratt even admits in his deposition that his
title agent recorded the trust deeds. (R. 516). These misleading statements
unjustly influence the Court into thinking that the liens were inappropriately
filed by Pugh when, in fact, Pugh had not even seen them prior to their filing.
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Pratt's bad faith is also apparent in Pratt's very argument that the liens are
wrongful. Pratt's Amended Petition contains two arguments for the lien being
wrongful under the Wrongful Lien Act. First, Pratt argues that Pugh "failed to
meet the conditions of the agreement (Investment Agreement) ." As explained
exhaustively above, Pugh was not even a party to the Investment Agreements,
thus the argument that the trust deeds are wrongful because of failing to comply
with the Investment Agreements is meritless.
Secondly, Pratt argues that because there was no "meeting of the m i n d s / '
the Security Agreement, signed by Pratt authorizing the liens, is invalid. (R. 82121). This second argument is not only meritless in determining if a lien is
wrongful pursuant to the Wrongful Lien Act, but is brought in bad faith. Pratt
argues that because Pugh repudiated the underlying contracts, after Pugh found
that the contracts were materially altered, there was never a valid contract
between the parties, rendering the liens invalid. However, this argument is
disingenuous and brought in bad faith, as Pratt has derived a benefit from the
underlying contracts and is attempting to circumvent his liability in the
companion case through this action.
Pratt's position that the underlying contracts and liens are invalid is in
direct contradiction to the fact that he has derived a benefit from them, and has

-15Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

testified that the Investment Agreements are valid entitling him to all benefits
contained therein. As explained above, the Investment Agreements outline the
contractual relationship between Pratt and Sovren. In exchange for providing
security for the $500,000 loan with his two properties, Sovren contracted to give
Pratt a "security interest in and an equity position in ten (10) tons of Maker's
(Sovren) high grade concentrate ore/ 7 (R. 635)

Pratt believed the ores to be

worth "six hundred thousand to a million dollars a ton . . . ." (R. 629).
Furthermore, not only does Pratt have interest and security in ore worth up to
ten million dollars ($10,000,000) as a result of securing Pugh $500,000 loan to
Sovren, but Pratt recieved a "2% interest in the real estate entity known as
Housing Partnership, . . . 1% ownership in a new established bank, and 1% stock
options." (R 635). Pratt also had his property taxes paid out of the $500,000 loan
monies. (Addendum J).
Pratt's contradictory and specious testimony accomplishes nothing less
than to allow him to have his cake and eat it too. If Pratt were allowed to side
step liability by removing the liens by claiming the contracts are invalid, while
asserting a right to collect on the Investment Agreements, he would receive a
financial windfall, leaving Pugh and his business partners with no security for
their $500,000 loan. These statements by Pratt are further evidence of Pratt's
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significant bad faith throughout this proceeding.
Pratt has continually mislead the court, given contradictory testimony, and
made meritless arguments using inaccurate information. The aforementioned
actions of Pratt were clearly in bad faith and resulted in months of discovery and
the unnecessary accrual of significant costs and attorney's fees.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, it is respectfully submitted that the Trial Court's granting of
summary judgment in favor of the Petitioner be overturned, that judgment be entered on
behalf of the Respondent holding the liens valid, and Respondent be awarded costs and
reasonable attorney fees.
DATED this

day of November, 2009.

JAMES C.HASKINS
GRAHAM J. HASKINS
Attorneys for Charles Pugh
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